In this work we re-visit the question of building cryptographic primitives that remain secure even when queried on inputs that depend on the secret key. This was investigated by Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton in the context of randomized encryption schemes and in the random oracle model. We extend the investigation to deterministic symmetric schemes (such as PRFs and block ciphers) and to the standard model. We term this notion "security against key-dependent-input attack ", or KDI-security for short. Our motivation for studying KDI security is the existence of significant real-world implementations of deterministic encryption (in the context of storage encryption) that actually rely on their building blocks to be KDI secure.
INTRODUCTION
Does it make sense for an application to self-encrypt an encryption key? That is, if Es represents an encryption function with key s, would it ever be the case that an application Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. needs to store or transmit Es(s)? Cryptographers typically see this as a dangerous abuse of an encryption scheme, and standard security criteria for encryption scheme do not take this possibility into account. Still, there are applications where such form of security is helpful. This security concern was formally defined and studied by Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton [4] in the context of symmetric encryption under the name KDM-security (for Key-Dependent-Messages). In particular Black et al. proved that KDM-secure symmetric encryption can be achieved in the random-oracle model.
If "encrypting your own key" is abusive for randomized encryption, using this practice with deterministic constructions (such as pseudo-random functions and permutations) seems even more dangerous. The present work was motivated by a real-world application that turned out to be doing just that: the IEEE P1619 standard group was developing a standard for "sector level encryption" [13] , which must be length-preserving and hence must be deterministic. The group was considering a scheme based on the tweakable cipher of Liskov et al. [16] , but some members objected, citing an attack that can be mounted when the proposed scheme is applied to its own secret key. An argument ensued as to whether or not this "self-encryption" scenario is a real problem or just a theoretical possibility that would never happen in the real world. The argument was decided when the group was informed that the implementation of disk encryption in Windows Vista TM can store to the disk an encryption of its own secret keys in some situations. Consequently, the group switched to a different scheme, based on Rogaway's work [20] , for which the particular attack in question does not seem to apply (see more details in Section 5 and in [12] ).
Another reason to study KDI-security arises in the context of anonymous credentials: Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [5] introduced the notion of "circular security", which is similar to (but somewhat weaker than) KDI security, and used it as a tool to discourage delegation of credentials in an anonymous credential system. Also, in the formal-methods community the definitional work of Black et al. from [4] was used to strengthen the definition of computational encryption and prove it equivalent to the Dolev-Yao formulation [15, 1] .
Our results
In this work we re-visit KDM security, with emphasis on deterministic constructions and analysis in the standard model. We rename the notion to KDI security, to stress that we are not talking only about encryption (and hence the Input is not necessarily a Message). We demonstrate some inherent limitations of these notions and present positive and negative results concerning the KDI security of encryption, pseudo-random functions and (tweakable) pseudorandom permutations, with respect to this notion, both in the standard model and in the "ideal cipher model".
Definition and inherent limitations.
We begin in Section 2 by exploring the notion of KDIsecurity and its limitations, specifically as they pertain to deterministic constructions. We observe that KDI-security of deterministic schemes cannot be achieved (even in an idealized models) without restricting the key-dependent queries that the attacker can make: Allowing the attacker to query a function fs on multiple functions of the key necessarily translates into a KDI attack that recovers the full key, and this attack works even if the underlying primitive is an "ideal cipher" or a random oracle! (This is similar to the setting of "related key attacks" [2] .) In practical terms this means that an application must restrict the types of information on the key that may potentially be "encrypted" under the key itself.
For this reason, we parametrize KDI security by the set of functions of the key that the attacker can use in its queries. Given the impossibility mentioned above when the set of functions is too rich, it makes sense to even investigate the minimal notion of KDI-security with respect to just a single function, as we may at least hope that even an abusive implementation that "encrypts its own key" will only do so in one form, rather than "encrypting" many copies of the key in many different forms (e.g., it may encrypt the key itself or a hash of the key, but not multiple, arbitrary functions of the key). In particular, negative results obtained in this minimalistic setting imply impossibility of stronger notions of KDI security. In this light, we investigate the existence of schemes that are KDI-secure with respect to all efficient deterministic functions of the key, as long as the attacker is restricted to query a single function of its choice in the attack.
Pseudo-random functions.
We investigate in Sections 3 and 4 the existence of pseudorandom functions (PRFs) that are KDI secure with respect to any (single) function of the key, and present the following results:
1. We show that in the "ideal cipher model", KDI security is achievable if one restricts the functions of the key that can be queried to be independent of the ideal cipher itself.
2. In contrast we prove that this goal cannot be achieved in the standard model, by showing that for each (deterministic) PRF family there is a function of the key relative to which the given family in not KDI secure.
3. On the positive side, if we allow the PRF construction to depend on a fixed public random value, often called a "salt" (and do not allow the function of the key to depend on the same salt value), then we can get KDIsecurity in the standard model (assuming that standard PRFs exist).
4. The construction from 3 also implies a non-constructive proof that for every function g there is a PRF (whose description depends on g) that is KDI-secure against this particular function g. We show also a constructive proof for the case where g is a "well spread" function.
Tweakable ciphers.
We return in Section 5 to the "ideal cipher model" to study the KDI security of tweakable ciphers (which are the basis for the IEEE P1619 standard that provided the initial motivation of this work). We establish a definition of KDI security for tweakable ciphers, describe an attack on a scheme of Liskov et al. [16] thus demonstrating that it is not KDI-secure (even in the "ideal cipher model"), and then show that some other schemes (including the one by Rogaway [20] ) are KDI-secure in this model.
Randomized encryption.
We conclude in Section 6 by taking another look at randomized encryption, in particular PRF-based symmetric encryption. Black et al. proved in [4] that the encryption scheme Encs(x) = (r, fs(r) ⊕ x) is KDI-secure when fs is implemented using a random oracle as fs(x) = H(s|x). We observe that this encryption scheme is not KDI-secure in general when we only require that fs is a secure PRF, not even if fs is itself KDI-secure. More surprisingly, this construction fails even for "natural" choices of the PRF fs, such as when instantiated using the Davies-Meyer construction. (This serves as an interesting reminder of the caution one has to exercise when basing security on idealized models.)
On the positive side, we show that if fs is a KDI-secure invertible PRF, then the encryption scheme Encs(x) = (r, fs(r) ⊕ fs(x)) is also KDI secure. Unfortunately our salted PRF from Item 3 above seems to be inherently non-invertible, but the "g-specific construction" from Item 4 can be made invertible and, if randomized, can work for any function g, not just a "well spread" one. Hence we obtain for every function g an encryption scheme Enc (g) that is KDI secure with respect to that function g.
Very recently we were told of an independent (yet unpublished) work of Hofheinz and Unruh, where they considered the issue of key-dependent security for randomized encryption in the standard model and obtained results that are rather complimentary to ours.
The moral.
We view the results in this work as lending support to the "common cryptographic wisdom" that the practice of self encryption of a key is a dangerous abuse of a cryptosystem. We demonstrate that many security goals that can be stated with respect to this practice inherently cannot be achieved; in some cases not even in an idealized model. Our counterexample for the case of randomized encryption (Section 6) is particularly troubling: We show a failure of a textbook construction for symmetric encryption with respect to a very natural implementation of its components. Moreover, this is the case in spite of the fact that almost the same construction was previously proved secure in the random oracle model! We also show that similar warnings apply to other secret-key primitives, such as a PRF, when applied to the key or, more generally, to a function of the key. On the positive side, we show explicit constructions that achieve limited notions of KDI security (even in the standard model). Two interesting open questions that remain are finding, for each function g of the key, a (deterministic) PRF that is KDI secure with respect to g and, more fundamentally, finding a symmetric encryption scheme that can be proven KDI-secure in the standard model with respect to any function g.
Terminology.
To simplify the presentation we state our results in the language of asymptotic security, using the terms "feasible" for probabilistic polynomial-time, "non-negligible"or "noticeable" for larger than some polynomial fraction, and "negligible" or "insignificant" for smaller than any polynomial fraction. It is clear, however, that all the results could also be stated in the language of "exact security" (at a price of a somewhat more cluttered presentation). 
DEFINITIONAL APPROACH AND SOME INTRINSIC LIMITATIONS
Roughly, to define security with respect to key-dependent input attacks we modify the standard attack scenarios for the various primitives that we study, by allowing the attacker to query its oracles not only on explicit strings but also on functions of the secret key. That is, where the original notion provided the attacker access to an oracle O(·), we add an oracle O (·) that gets as input a description of a function g (e.g., in the form of a circuit that computes the function) and outputs O(g(s)) where s is the secret key of the construction in question. We will refer to the queries to O as functional queries. We extend this definitional approach to the "ideal cipher model" by allowing oracle access to keyed random permutations (and their inverses) and by possibly allowing the functional queries to depend on these oracles.
Ideally, we would like to find constructions that remain secure even when the attacker can query the primitive on any efficient function of the key. There are, however, some inherent limitations to this approach. For example, letting the attacker query a cipher Es on input g(s) = E −1 s (s), the key would be obviously exposed. A more general limitation arises in the context of deterministic primitives, as we show next.
KDI-Insecurity against unrestricted queries.
The idea of this argument is that an attacker can try to apply many different functions to the key s, and use collisions of the form g(s) = g (s) to do a binary search for the key s. That is, the attacker uses two different functional queries g, g , and checks if it gets the same answer on both. This (in essence) tells the attacker whether g(s) = g (s), which cuts the key-space by two. Here we describe a simple example of this argument, which is essentially the same as the one described in [2] in the context of related-key attacks.
Let Ψ be any deterministic construction that has a secret key (such that the disclosure of s compromises the security of Ψ). For simplicity (this is not essential for the general argument), assume that both the key space and the input space of Ψ is {0, 1} n , and that for every fixed key s ∈ {0, 1} n . For example, for all i < n we set gi to be xor with 0 n−i 10 i−1 and g i to be addition of 2 i modulo 2 n .) The attacker then simply queries its oracle Ψ on the inputs gi and g i for all i. If the i'th bit of the secret key is 0 then gi(s) = g i (s) and therefore Ψ (g) = Ψ(gi(s)) = Ψ(g i (s)) = Ψ (g ) (because Ψ is deterministic). On the other hand, if the i'th bit of the secret key is 1 then gi(s) = g i (s) and since Ψ is injective it follows that also Ψ (g) = Ψ(gi(s)) = Ψ(g i (s)) = Ψ (g ). The attacker can therefore determine all the bits of the secret key s in violation of the security of Ψ.
Parametrized definition.
As a consequence of the above observations, and similar to the case of key-related attacks [2] , the definition of KDIsecurity will be parametrized by a class of function descriptions C, and all the queries to the O oracle will be restricted to functions from C. The question of whether KDI security with respect to a certain class C provides a meaningful level of security depends heavily on the application. In some cases anything less than "all polynomial-size circuits" may be insufficient while in others having C restricted to the identity function only (i.e., one is allowed to query the primitive on the key itself but not on other functions of the key) may suffice.
In many cases, providing security assurance against one function of the key, i.e., the case where |C| = 1, will be of significant value: we may at least hope that even an abusive implementation that "encrypts its own key" will only do so in one form, rather than encrypting many copies of the key in many different forms. Given the limitations discussed above (and more to be shown in the sequel) we will judge different constructions under the "modest" requirement that they resist singleton classes |C| = 1. We would like to get a construction that is KDI secure against all singleton classes (i.e., the attacker is allowed to choose a single function g(s) to query but the function g could be any efficient function of s). Unfortunately, examples such as the one with the function g(s) = E
−1
s (s) demonstrate that even this modest goal cannot always be achieved. In such a case we will study the "minimalist" requirement that a construction is KDI secure against one specific function.
PSEUDO-RANDOM FUNCTIONS
Below we use the convention that for security parameter n, the key for a pseudo-random function is a random n-bit string, and that the function is from {0,
out (n) where in and out are efficiently computable and polynomially bounded. Then a family of pseudo-random functions is an ensemble
and we require that there is an efficient evaluation procedure that given any s ∈ {0, 1} n and any
The standard security definition for pseudo-random functions as defined in [7] asserts that no feasible attacker A φ (1 n ) (with oracle access to φ) can distinguish with non-negligible advantage the case where φ = fs for a random s ∈R {0, 1} n from the case where φ is chosen as a random function from {0, 1} in (n) to {0, 1} out (n) . In order to capture KDI security of pseudo-random functions, we augment the standard definition of pseudo-random functions by letting the adversary also access another oracle φ that takes as input a description of a function g, and outputs φ(g(s)). (The output size of the functions g considered here is assumed to match the size of inputs to the pseudorandom function f .) Definition 1 (KDI-secure PRFs). A family F of pseudorandom functions is KDI-secure with respect to a class C of circuits if no feasible attacker A φ,φ (1 n ) (with oracle access to φ, φ ) can distinguish with non-negligible advantage between the following two cases:
φ is chosen as a random function
φ : {0, 1} in (n) → {0, 1} out (n) , s is chosen at random in {0, 1} n , and for any g ∈ C, φ (g) = φ(g(s)).
Note: Many of our results apply to the case where C includes a single function g; in this case, one can dispense of the φ oracle and simply assume that the attacker is given the value of φ(g(s)).
On KDI-insecure PRFs.
We first observe that secure PRFs (or block ciphers) are not necessarily KDI-secure, not even with respect to the identity function. Indeed, given any secure PRF family F = {Fs}, one can trivially modify it as follows: F s (x) = s if x = s and F s (x) = Fs(x) otherwise. Clearly, the family F = {F s } is still a secure PRF, but it is not KDI-secure with respect to the identity function. Similarly, if we start with a secure cipher E (a strong pseudo-random permutation) we can build another secure cipher E that is not KDI-secure with respect to the identity function:
Negative Example 1. There exist secure PRFs and secure block ciphers that are KDI-insecure with respect to the identity function.
Constructions in the "ideal-cipher model"
We saw above that the construction fs(x) = Es(x) where E is a secure block cipher is not necessarily KDI-secure. Here we show that this construction is at least KDI secure in the "ideal-cipher model". We begin by adapting our definition of KDI security to Shannon's "ideal cipher model".
Recall that in the ideal-cipher model, all the parties (including the attacker) are given black-box access to two tables Π(·, ·) and Π −1 (·, ·). These tables are chosen at random subject to the condition that for every "key" s, Π(s, ·) is a permutation and Π −1 (s, ·) is its inverse (and all these permutations are over the same domain). For simplicity of presentation we assume that on security parameter n, the key that selects the permutation is of length n bits and the permutations themselves are over {0, 1}
n . Namely, for each s ∈ {0, 1} n , Π(s, ·) is a random permutation over {0, 1} n , and Π −1 (s, ·) is the inverse permutation. We augment the definition of KDI-security to the idealcipher model by providing the attacker with oracle-access to Π, Π −1 , and more importantly by potentially allowing the class of function-descriptions in C to depend on Π and/or Π −1 . Specifically, in this case we allow the circuits in C to include also Π-gates that on input (s, x) return Π(s, x) (and similarly also Π −1 -gates). When stating a result in this paper in the context of the ideal cipher model we will specify whether we assume the functional queries g(s) to depend or not in the oracles Π and Π −1 . Note that when adapting Definition 1 to the "ideal cipher model", the attacker's advantage is measured with respect to the probability distribution where for each s ∈ {0, 1} n , Π(s, ·) is a random permutation over {0, 1} n and Π −1 (s, ·) is the inverse permutation (also, this advantage is parametrized in terms of the number of queries the attacker performs to these oracles as well as the number of such queries performed while computing the function g, if the latter depends on Π, Π −1 ). Remark. The distinction between circuits that include Π and Π −1 gates and circuits that do not is one of the main reasons for using the "ideal cipher model" in the KDI context. Indeed, in some cases we would like to argue that a cipher is KDI-secure with respect to any function g that "does not depend on the cipher itself". This restriction is generally not well defined in the standard model but can be captured in the "ideal cipher model" by specifying that the function g is described by a circuit that does not include Π or Π −1 gates.
KDI-security of fs(x) = Πs(x).
It is easy to see that even in the "ideal cipher model", we can find functions g that depend on Π such that the construction fs(x) = Π(s, x) is not KDI-secure with respect to g. For example, if we set g(
However, we can show that this construction is KDI secure with respect to every function g that does not depend on Π, specifically: 
Proof Sketch
The attacker A has access to three oracles: Π(·, ·), and Π −1 (·, ·) that represent the ideal cipher and f (·) which is either Π(s, ·) for a random s (the "real case"), or an independent random function (the "random case"). In addition, the attacker is given the value f (g(s)), where s is the key in the "real case" and just a random string in the "random case".
We consider a "hybrid case" which is just like the "random case", except that f is chosen as a random permutation rather than a random function. Clearly, the "hybrid" and the "random" cases cannot be distinguished upto the birthday bound. The heart of the proof is in showing that the attacker cannot distinguish the "hybrid" from the "real" case.
Next we argue that the attacker has only a negligible probability to ever query its Π or Π −1 oracles with the correct key s: since g is independent of Π, Π −1 then all the values that the attacker sees are entries of Π, Π −1 that by themselves are independent of s. (This is where the counterexample g(s) = Π −1 (s, s) comes in, dependent on Π −1 allows the attacker to ask for "the value in the entry in which s is written".) As long as the attacker still did not query Π or Π −1 with the right key s, then the answer that it got so far can be completely simulated by the attacker itself, save for cases where a query f (x) on some string x happened to return the same value as f (g(s) ). This last event either happens with negligible probability (if the pre-image of g(s) is smaller than 2 n/2 ) or they still leave exponentially many possibilities for s (if the pre-image of g(s) is larger). Hence the attacker only has an exponentially small probability of hitting the right key s in the next query that it makes.
But short of querying Π, Π −1 on the right s (and since g is independent of Π, Π −1 ), the answers that the attacker gets in both the "hybrid" and the "real" cases are drawn from the same probability distribution. Namely the initial value of f (g(s)) and the answers to all the queries to f are computed using a random permutation which is independent of the queries that the attacker makes to Π, Π −1 .
Similar claims can be made for many of the published PRPto-PRF constructions in the literature, e.g., the schemes from [3] , the truncation construction [10] , the XOR construction [18] , etc. 
KDI-SECURE PRFS IN THE STANDARD MODEL
We have shown that an ideal cipher is also a KDI-secure PRF with respect to any function g that does not depend on the cipher itself. On the other hand, we saw, in the examples following Definition 1, that in the standard model a secure cipher (or PRF) does not have to be KDI-secure, not even with respect to simple functions such as the identity function. Here we investigate the existence (and constructibility) of KDI-secure schemes in the standard model. One obstacle is the fact that in the standard model it is harder to impose independence between a PRF (or cipher) scheme and the function g.
No single deterministic construction for all g
We begin by showing that one cannot get a single deterministic construction that is KDI secure in the standard model with respect to every singleton class {g}.
Theorem 2 (No single construction for all g).
There exists no deterministic construction of a pseudo-random function family that is KDI-secure with respect to {g} for all functions g.
Proof. Let F = {Fs} be a pseudo-random family. Define gF (s) = Fs(0), and we show that F is not KDI-secure with respect to {gF }. An attacker A queries its key-dependent oracle to obtain a = Fs(gF (s)) = Fs(Fs(0)); then it queries the F -oracle on 0 to obtain b = Fs(0); finally, it queries the F -oracle on b to obtain c = Fs(b). A outputs 1 if a = c and 0 otherwise. Clearly, when the oracle F is answered with the pseudo-random function Fs then a = c and A outputs 1 with probability 1, while if the F -oracle is random then a and c are independent random values and hence A outputs 1 only with small probability.
Given Theorem 2, our options for obtaining positive results in the standard model are either to settle for randomized (or salted) constructions, or to come up with different constructions for different functions g. In Section 4.2 we show a randomized construction that is KDI secure with respect to g for any function g, while in Section 4.3 we show that for each "well spread" function g one can construct an explicit deterministic PRF (whose definition depends on g) that is KDI-secure with respect to the function g. This leaves open the question of whether one can construct, for each function g, an explicit deterministic PRF that is KDI secure with respect to g. (We note that the existence of non-explicit g-specific deterministic schemes for each g follows from our randomized construction.)
A single randomized construction for all g
Here we describe a construction for a pseudo-random function family F that depends on a public random "salt" r, such that for every function g, with high probability over the choice of r, the family F r is KDI-secure with respect to g. This construction uses in an essential way strong randomness extractors [19] , see a brief description and definitions in Appendix A. On a high level, our construction is as follows:
where f is a standard PRF, ext is a randomness extractor, and Compress is some function whose output is much shorter than its input. The goal is to "break the dependence" between the input and the key, even in the case where the input is g(s). Roughly, since Compress outputs very short strings, then there must be many different keys s that match any value of Compress (g(s)). Namely, s still has high entropy even given the value Compress(g(s) ), so extr(s) is likely to be random and independent of Compress (g(s)). Of course, one also needs to argue Compress does not introduce easy to find collisions which would destroy the PRF property of F . This can be done by using a collision resistant function, but then we would have to assume that those exist. Instead, in the long version [9] we show that some form of universal hashing is sufficient in this context. (This complicates the proof, but let us rely on a weaker assumption.) Specifically, in the long version we analyze the following construction:
where
n/12 is a strong (n/3, 2 −n/12 , 2 −3n/4 ) randomness extractor, 3 and H : {0,
6m is a hash function, which is defined as follows: The (n/12)-bit key is interpreted as an element u ∈ GF (2 n/2 ) (say, by padding it with zero bits), the n-bit input is interpreted as two element x1, x2 ∈ GF (2 n/2 ), and the function is defined as
Using the fact that this function H is regular (for every key u), and also it has low collision probability and very short keys, we prove that collisions must be rare. Then applying the reasoning from above we conclude that this construction is KDI-secure with respect to any function g, with high probability over r1, r2. 
On g-dependent deterministic KDI-secure schemes
The construction from Section 4.2 implies a non-constructive deterministic g-dependent KDI-secure scheme for each function g (i.e., for each g, there exist values rg, r g for which F rg ,r g is KDI-secure with respect to g). In this section we attempt a constructive proof of the same fact, namely, a deterministic transformation that takes a circuit that computes g and produces a PRF that is KDI-secure with respect to function g. We succeed to do so only for functions g that are "well spread" (i.e., for each s, g −1 (g(s)) is not too big).
First try. We begin with a simple construction that at first glance looks as if it should work. Let f = {fs} be a pseudorandom function with (n + 1)-bit inputs and n-bit outputs and keys. Fix some function g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , and define a family F
s } with n-bit inputs, outputs, and keys:
Perhaps surprisingly, we show that this construction does not always work:
Negative Example 2. There are functions g s.t. F (g) from Eq. (2) is not KDI-secure with respect to {g}.

Proof. Define g(s) = fs(0). We show a KDI-attacker
A that distinguishes between F (g) and a random function. The attacker A has input a = φ (g) = φ(g(s)), it queries the oracle φ on a to get b = φ(a), and outputs 1 if a = b and 0 otherwise.
When the φ-oracle is a real one (i.e., instantiated with F
s (g(s)) = fs(0), thus A outputs 1 with probability 1. On the other hand, if the φ oracle is a random function then a is a random value and b = φ(a) is an independent random value, hence a = b happens only with small probability.
The reason for this counter-example is that the attacker is able to compute g(s) given access to F (g) . Indeed, it is not hard to show that when g(s) is unpredictable even given access to F (g) then the construction from above is secure (a proof is implicit in the proof of Lemma 1 below). Thus we try to construct a PRF F (g) such that g(s) is unpredictable given access to F (g) s (·) and then use it as above. (Clearly, this is not possible if there is a single value of g(s) that 4 Hereafter, we limit our treatment to efficiently (polynomial-size) computable functions g. occurs with noticeable probability, but it does work as long as g(s) has sufficient min-entropy.) In the long version [9] we analyze the construction
n is a standard pseudorandom function family (for some constant α > 0), and prfix(s) the first αn bits of s. We show that if the distribution on g(s) for a random s has min-entropy more than αn + ω(log n) then the function F (g) s (x) from above is KDIsecure with respect to g. Roughly, the reason is that since prfix(s) has only αn bits then g(s) still has min-entropy ω(log n) even conditioned on prfix(s is KDI-secure PRF with respect to the singleton class {g}.
Randomized extension to any function g.
The construction from Eq. (3) can be extended (via randomization!) to deal also with "low entropy" functions g by replacing prfix(s) with a randomness extractor extr(s), i.e.,
where f accepts (n + 1)-bit inputs and short keys (if needed, such keys can be expanded into longer ones using a pseudorandom generator applied to extr(s)).
As in the case of the scheme from Eq. (1), the intuition is that if g is "low entropy" then extr(s) is close to uniform even given g(s), and for "high-entropy" g(s) the reasoning from the proof above still holds when replacing prfix(s) with extr(s). These arguments can be extended to arbitrary functions g as stated in Lemma 2 below. Note that the resulting scheme is both randomized and "tailored" for each g, and hence inferior to the construction in Section 4.2. On the other hand, scheme (4) preserves invertibility, namely, if f is a family of invertible pseudorandom permutations (over
is a KDI-secure invertible pseudorandom family mapping n bits into n + 1 bits. This fact is used in an essential way in Section 6 to claim KDI-secure encryption (cf. Theorem 4). from Eq. (4) is a KDI-secure PRF with respect to the singleton class {g}, with high probability over the choice of the salt r.
In the long version of this note [9] we also show an example of a more "natural" (or "less tailored"), which is KDI-secure with respect to the identity function.
TWEAKABLE PSEUDO-RANDOM PER-MUTATIONS
Recall that a tweakable cipher (or tweakable pseudo-random permutation) [16] has a key and two inputs: a plaintext and a tweak. Below we use the convention that for security parameter n, both the plaintext and the tweak are nbit strings, and that the cipher key is of length {0, 1} (n) where is some polynomially bounded function (we often use (n) = n or (n) = 2n). Formally a family of tweakable pseudo-random permutations is an ensemble
where S denotes the symmetric group, and we require that there are efficient evaluation and inversion procedures that given any s, t ∈ {0, 1} n and any x ∈ {0, 1} (n) compute y = ps,t(x) and z = p −1 s,t (x), respectively. The standard security definition for strong tweakable pseudorandom permutations as defined in [17, 16] asserts that no feasible attacker A π,π (1 n ) (with oracle access to π, π −1 ) can distinguish with any non-negligible advantage the case where for a random s ∈R {0, 1} n we set π(t, x) ≡ ps,t(x) and π
, from the case where for every t ∈ {0, 1} n , π(t, ·) is chosen as a random permutation over {0, 1}
and π −1 (t, ·) is set to the inverse permutation. Adding KDI-security to this definition requires some choices. The attacker in this model has two oracles, each with two inputs (namely π(·, ·) and π −1 (·, ·)) and we need to decide what input to what oracle can depend on the key. In this work we only consider the variant where the plaintext/ciphertext inputs to both π and π −1 can depend on the key, but not the tweaks. The reason that we do not consider key-dependent tweaks is that tweaks typically represent some context information or label that comes from a higher layer (e.g., in the storage application that motivated this paper the tweak represents the physical position where the data is to be stored), and so it may be reasonable to assume that it does not depend on the key.
With these choices, we modify the standard definition of tweakable PRPs by giving the adversary access to two additional oracles ψ, ψ −1 that take as input a tweak t and a description of a function g and output π(t, g(s)) and π −1 (t, g(s)), respectively.
Definition 2 (KDI-secure tweakable strong PRPs).
A family P of tweakable pseudo-random permutations is KDIsecure with respect to a class C of circuits if no feasible attacker
(1 n ) can distinguish with non-negligible advantage between the following two cases:
The key s ∈R {0, 1}
n is chosen at random, and for any t, x, g the oracles are set as,
n is chosen at random, for every t ∈ {0, 1} n we set π(t, ·) to a random permutation over {0, 1} and π g(s) ).
−1 (t, ·) to its inverse, and then ψ(t, g) ≡ π(t, g(s)), and ψ
As before, Definition 2 is adapted to the "ideal cipher model" by giving oracle access to the ideal cipher Π, Π −1 to the construction itself, the attacker A, and potentially also the circuits in C. Below we demonstrate that some constructions of tweakable ciphers in the literature are KDI insecure against simple functions of the key, while others can be proven secure in the ideal cipher model.
KDI-insecurity of the LRW constructions.
Consider the following instantiation of the second construction of Liskov et al. from [16] . This instantiation has two keys, denoted s1, s2, where s1 is used as a key for an underlying block cipher E and s2 is treated as an element of GF (2 n ) with n the block-size of E. This construction then defines the following tweakable cipher, with both the block size and the tweak size equals to n bits:
where t·s2 is a multiplication in GF (2 n )). In [16] it is shown that the generic construction Es 1 (hs 2 (t) ⊕ x) ⊕ hs 2 (t) is a secure tweakable cipher when E is a secure cipher and h is a "xor-universal" hash function, which implies the security of Eq. (5) since hs 2 (t) = t · s2 is indeed xor-universal.
However, as pointed out when this construction was considered for the IEEE 1619 standard, this construction is not KDI-secure with respect to the function g(s1, s2) = s2 (i.e., when "encrypting" the element s2 from the secret key). The attacker can query ψ(0, g) (i.e., using tweak value 0 and "plaintext" s2) and also π(1, 0) (i.e., tweak value 1 and "plaintext" 0), thus getting c1 =Ẽs 1 ,s 2 (0, s2) = Es 1 (s2) and c2 =Ẽs 1 ,s 2 (1, 0) = Es 1 (s2)⊕s2
Next the attacker can compute s2 = c1 ⊕ c2 and then verify this value (e.g., by asking to "decrypt" the value of c1 ⊕ 2s2 with respect to the tweak value 2).
Negative Example 3. The construction from Eq. (5) is not KDI-secure with respect to the function g(s1, s2) = s2.
KDI-security of the "trivial construction".
Alternatively, consider the "trivial" construction of tweakable SPRP from a block cipher
It is easy to see that if E is a secure cipher then this construction is a secure tweakable cipher. Although there are functions g for which this construction is not KDI-secure (for example the function g(s) = E
−1 Es(t)
(0), we can show, however, thatẼ from Eq. (6) is KDI-secure in the "ideal cipher model" with respect to any function that does not depend on the cipher itself. Proof Sketch Again, the proof is straightforward. Recall that the adversary in this game has six oracles: Π(·, ·) and Π −1 (·, ·) that represent the ideal cipher,Ẽ(·, ·) and E −1 (·, ·) that represent either the construction with a fixed random key s or a random tweakable permutation (independent of Π), and ψ(·) and ψ −1 (·) that allow key-dependent queries 5 with ψ(t) =Ẽ(t, g(s)) and ψ −1 (t) =Ẽ −1 (t, g(s)) (where s is the secret key in case one and just a random string in case two).
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 1, the proof goes by arguing that the attacker is very unlikely to ever query its Π or Π −1 oracles on the right "key" s, and without such queries the view of the attacker is the same in both cases.
Other constructions.
We comment that a similar lemma can be proven also for Rogaway's XEX construction from [20] , where on input x and tweak (i, j) one computes:
Namely, this construction too can be proven KDI-secure in the "ideal cipher model" with respect to any function g that does not depend on the ideal cipher. The proof itself is very similar to Rogaway's proof of security for XEX [20] . The key-dependent queries are handled using the fact that in the "ideal cipher model" the quantity Es(j) is independent of s for all j, and therefore the attacker is unlikely to be able to issue two queries for which (2 i ·Es(j))⊕x = (2 i ·Es(j ))⊕x (even if x, x can be set as functions of the secret key s).
SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
Being randomized, encryption schemes are potentially easier to make KDI secure than non-randomized primitives such as PRFs and ciphers. Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton studied in [4] the question of KDI-security for symmetric encryption (under the name KDM-security). They presented a definition of security (using much of the same rationale as in Section 2), and proved that it can be easily met in the random-oracle model. However, we do not know of a construction that achieves similar level of KDI security in the standard model (not even with respect to all singletons {g}). Yet, we provide two significant results in this section: The first shows that a natural "textbook" PRF-based encryption scheme that is KDI-secure in the random oracle model (with respect to all functions g) is not KDI-secure in the standard model, not even with respect to the identity function, not even when the PRF itself is KDI secure, and not even with respect to "practical instantiations" of the pseudorandom function. The second result shows that for every function g we can build an encryption scheme that is KDI-secure with respect to {g} (based on any invertible pseudorandom function, such as any block cipher).
Definitions
Recall that a (symmetric) encryption scheme consists of algorithms for key-generation, encryption and decryption, E = (Gen, Enc, Dec), with Gen, Enc randomized and where both Enc and Dec use the secret key that is generated by Gen. Below we assume that for security parameter n, the messages that are encrypted are of length n. The standard definitions of CPA-security for symmetric encryption (cf. [8, 14] ) asserts that no feasible attacker with oracle access to the encryption algorithm (with the secret key hard-wired) can produce two equal-length messages m, m for which it can distinguish with non-negligible advantage a random encryption of m from a random encryption of m . The standard definition for CCA-security is similar except that the attacker is also given access to a decryption oracle, but is not allowed to query that oracle on the ciphertext for which it needs to decide if it came from m or m .
As usual, we incorporate KDI-security by providing another oracle to the attacker that on input a function g outputs the encryption of g(s) under the secret key s. The attacker A interacts with these oracles and then outputs two queries q1, q2 for these oracles (each qi can be a query to either e(·) or e (·)). It is important to observe that we do not allow key-dependent queries to the decryption oracle. In particular, note that if we allowed such queries then one could query the decryption oracle with the function g(s) = Encs(s) and obtain s (this is possible even if one restricts the functions in C to be deterministic, as we could define the function g(s) to be the encryption of s with the random coins set to a fixed string, say all zeros). Finally, note that Definition 3 can be adapted to the "ideal cipher model" by providing A (and potentially also the circuits in C) with oracle access to Π and Π −1 .
A bit b ∈R {0,
Insecurity of a textbook randomized scheme
Below we consider a very natural PRF-based symmetric encryption scheme, which is essentially the scheme that was proven secure in the random-oracle model by Black et al. We show that not only this construction fails to be KDI secure in the standard model, but this failure is manifested even for a natural instantiations of the PRF. Given a PRF fs(·) we define
where r is chosen at random with each encryption. This encryption scheme is CPA-secure (up to the birthday bound on |r|) if fs(·) is a secure PRF, and, intuitively, it appears that it "should" also be KDI-secure. In particular, it was shown in [4, Thm 5.1] that when fs is implemented as fs(x) = H(s|x) and H is a random oracle, then the scheme in Eq. (8) is KDI-secure with respect to all functions of the key s. We demonstrate, however, that this construction is not KDI-secure in general, and perhaps more surprising it even fails for practical PRFs. Specifically, we show that when the underlying PRF is implemented from a block cipher via the Davies-Meyer construction, the resulting encryption scheme is not KDI-secure, even with respect to the identity function (and even if the block cipher itself is an ideal cipher!). Recall the Davies-Meyer construction
This construction was meant as a component of a collisionresistant hash function, but for contemporary block ciphers one can expect it to also be a good PRF. (For example, the assumption that the Davies-Meyer compression function keyed via its IV is a PRF was used in the analysis of HMAC.) Moreover, it is easy to prove that when E is an ideal cipher, then the Davies-Meyer construction is a KDI-secure PRF with respect to any function g that does not depend on the ideal cipher itself Plugging the Davies-Meyer construction in Eq. (8) we obtain the encryption scheme Encs(x) = (r, (Er(s) ⊕ s) ⊕ x). An attacker that asks to encrypt the secret key will get Encs(s) = (r, (Er(s) ⊕ s) ⊕ s) = (r, Er(s)), from which it can recover s (using the decryption routine E −1 with r as a key). We note that this construction fails even if E is an ideal cipher (and also when augmented with a MAC function to provide CCA security).
Negative Example 4. The symmetric encryption scheme Encs(x) = (r, x⊕fs(r)), with fs implemented via the DaviesMeyer construction fs(x) = Ex(s) ⊕ s, is KDI-insecure with respect to the identity function, even when E is an ideal cipher.
KDI-secure symmetric encryption
On the positive side, we show that an invertible KDIsecure PRF can be used to obtain KDI-secure symmetric encryption, using a slight variation of the insecure "textbook construction" from above. (We call a PRF fs invertible if given s and fs(x) one can efficiently recover x.) Specifically, consider the encryption scheme Encs(x) = (r, fs(r) ⊕ fs(x)), Decs(r, y) = f Proof. Fix a class C and assume toward contradiction that the encryption scheme from Eq. (10) is not CPA-KDI secure with respect to C, and we show that the underlying family fs cannot be KDI-secure PRF with respect to C. Let AE be an attacker that demonstrates the KDI-insecurity of the encryption scheme, and we use it to describe an attacker A f that demonstrates the KDI-insecurity of the PRF family.
A f is provided with oracle access to φ, φ , as described in Definition 1. It activates the attacker AE (on the same security parameter). When AE asks to encrypt an explicit string x then A f chooses a random string r, queries s = φ(r) and t = φ(x) and returns the ciphertext (r, s ⊕ t) to AE. When AE asks to encrypt g(s) for some g ∈ C then A f chooses again a random string r queries s = φ(r) and t = φ (g) (= φ(g(s) )), and returns the ciphertext (r, s⊕t) to AE. When AE outputs q0, q1 then A f chooses a random bit b and returns an encryption of q b using the same procedure as above. Finally A f outputs whatever AE does.
It follows by definition that when φ = fs then the view of AE is identical to its view when interacting with the real encryption scheme. On the other hand, when φ is a random function then the view of AE is nearly independent of q0, q1 (except for the case where the random string r that A f chooses for the encryption of q b collides with an earlier input to φ or φ , which happens with negligible probability if |r| is large enough). Hence the advantage of A f is negligibly close to half the advantage of AE.
Lemma 4 tells us that we can get KDI-secure encryption from invertible KDI-secure PRFs, so it is natural to ask if the KDI-secure PRF schemes studied in this paper can be made invertible. Clearly, the trivial construction fs(x) = ES(x) from Section 3.1 is invertible, and it is KDI-secure in the ideal cipher model (but not in the standard model). On the other hand, the construction from Eq. (1) in Section 4.2, i.e., Fs(x) = f ext (s) (H ext(s) (x)), seems inherently non-invertible; in fact the security proof for it relies in an essential manner on H(x) having many fewer bits than x itself. Fortunately, the g-dependent construction (4) from Section 4.3 is invertible if the underlying PRF f is invertible (e.g., when f is a block cipher) and it is KDI secure wrt {g} in the standard model. Therefore, if we instantiate the encryption scheme defined in Eq. (10) with the scheme F (g,r) of Eq. (4) (and assuming the function f underlying F (g,r) is invertible) we obtain an encryption scheme Enc (g) that is, according to Lemma 4, CPA-KDI-secure. Note that the random salt r used in F (g,r) (which is in addition to, and independent from, the randomness r in Eq. (10)) can be chosen by the encryptor with each encryption or can be chosen at random and be fixed as a parameter of Enc (g) . From this discussion and Lemma 2 we obtain the following result. 
